Introduction

Most AI legislation starts from the wrong premise. It asks: how do we make companies comply? The Minnesota Digital Trust & Consumer Protection Act asks a different question: how do we make AI accountability structurally inevitable?

The distinction is not semantic. Compliance-first frameworks create checklists. Rights-first frameworks create architectures. The Digital Trust Act is an architecture.

The Problem with Compliance Frameworks

The dominant approach to AI regulation — exemplified by the EU AI Act's risk classification system and Colorado's reasonable care standard — treats compliance as the goal. Companies must assess risk, implement safeguards, document decisions, and submit to audits. The underlying assumption is that if companies follow the right process, acceptable outcomes will follow.

This assumption is wrong for AI systems in a way it is not wrong for traditional regulated products. Here is why.

The Opacity Problem

Traditional product liability assumes that a manufacturer can know what its product does. A pharmaceutical company can characterize the mechanism of action of a drug. An automobile manufacturer can specify the braking distance of a vehicle. This knowability is what makes compliance regimes workable — you can comply with a requirement to make a safe product because you can define and test what "safe" means.

AI systems break this assumption. Large language models, reinforcement learning systems, and multi-agent architectures exhibit emergent behaviors that their developers did not design and cannot fully predict. Compliance with process requirements does not guarantee acceptable outcomes when the system's behavior is not fully characterizable.

The Enforcement Gap

Even well-designed compliance frameworks fail without enforcement. The Federal Trade Commission, which bears primary responsibility for AI enforcement at the federal level, has limited resources and competing priorities. State attorneys general face similar constraints.

The Digital Trust Act addresses this through a structural mechanism rather than an enforcement mechanism: the surety bond.

The Architecture of the Digital Trust Act

The Act creates four interconnected structures.

1. Bonded Credentials

The bonded credential system makes accountability economic. An AI agent cannot operate in regulated commerce without a credential backed by capital. If the agent causes harm, the surety bond provides immediate recourse — no litigation required, no regulatory action needed.

This is not a new concept. Surety bonds have been used in construction, financial services, and professional licensing for centuries. The innovation is applying this proven accountability mechanism to AI agents.

2. Strict Liability for Issuers

The Act imposes strict liability on credential issuers — the entities that evaluate and certify AI agents. This creates a private market for AI safety assessment, where issuers have a direct financial incentive to rigorously evaluate the agents they certify.

This structure mirrors the relationship between credit rating agencies and bond issuers, but with a critical improvement: the credential issuer's capital is directly at risk, aligning incentives in a way that the credit rating model did not.

3. Substrate-Agnostic Framework

The Act deliberately avoids defining "AI" in terms of specific technologies. Instead, it defines "AI agent" functionally: any autonomous or semi-autonomous system that takes actions with legal or economic consequences on behalf of a principal.

This substrate-agnostic approach means the Act will remain relevant as the underlying technology evolves. Whether the agent runs on a transformer architecture, a neuro-symbolic system, or something not yet invented, the accountability framework applies.

4. The Digital Trust Office

The Act creates a Digital Trust Office within the Minnesota Department of Commerce, charged with credentialing approved issuers, maintaining a public registry of bonded AI agents, and adjudicating bond claims.

This office is designed to be small and efficient. The bonded credential system is largely self-enforcing — the financial incentives do most of the regulatory work.

Comparison with Existing Frameworks

| Feature | EU AI Act | CO AI Act | MN Digital Trust Act | |---|---|---|---| | Approach | Risk classification | Reasonable care | Bonded credentials | | Enforcement | Regulatory (fines) | Litigation (private right of action) | Economic (surety bonds) | | Scope | Technology-specific | Activity-specific | Substrate-agnostic | | Accountability | Process-based | Standard of care | Capital at risk | | Speed of remedy | Years (regulatory process) | Years (litigation) | Days (bond claim) |

Why This Matters

The Digital Trust Act is not just another piece of AI legislation. It is a proof of concept for a different approach to technology governance — one that creates structural accountability rather than process compliance, that uses economic mechanisms rather than regulatory enforcement, and that remains relevant as the technology evolves.

If the approach works in Minnesota, it provides a model for other states and for federal legislation. If it fails, the failure will be informative — it will tell us something important about whether market-based accountability mechanisms can work for AI systems.

Either way, the experiment is worth running.

Current Status

The Act was introduced as SF 2024 in the Minnesota Senate and referred to the Commerce and Consumer Protection Committee in February 2026. Hearings have not yet been scheduled.


This analysis will be updated as the legislative process progresses.